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COMMENTS
BANK MERGERS AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, Justice Stewart commented: "The sole consistency that I can find
is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins."' This statement
aptly described the result of any government action brought under section 7 of
the Clayton Act 2 to forestall horizontal mergers by, inter alia, banking
institutions. 3 Since 1963, when the Justice Department brought its first
section 7 action to prevent the merger of two banking institutions, the
government has triumphed repeatedly. 4 Although changes to the banking law
have been enacted in an attempt to restrict the scope of previous Supreme
Court decisions,5 the Justice Department, in turn, has been attempting to
broaden the application of section 7 by invoking the concept of potential
competition as a vehicle to limit geographic market extension mergers. 6
However, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation,7
recently inflicted a major defeat on the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. This Comment will examine the application of section 7 to the
banking industry, the development of the doctrine of potential competition
and its possible utilization in the banking field, and the implications of the
recent Supreme Court decision.
II. THE BANKING INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST
A. Structure and Regulation Prior to 1960
Commercial banks8 are subject to regulation by both the federal and state
governments. Federal law prohibits banks (or bank holding companies) from
1. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 provides in pertinent part: "No corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock. . . or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
3. "A horizontal merger commonly is defined as a merger between firms preiously in
competition with one another." 16A J. von Kalinowski, Business Organizations. Antitrust Laws
and Trade Regulation § 17.01, at 17-2 (1971).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970);
United States v. Third Nat'1 Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank,
386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
5. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970); see notes 43-50 infra and
accompanying text.
6. "An acquisition or merger is described as geographic market extension where one firm
merges with or acquires another firm that manufactures or sells the same products but in different
geographical areas." 16A J. von Kalinowski, Business Organizations: Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 17.05, at 17-23 (1971).
7. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
8. A commercial bank accepts demand deposits and furnishes short-term business loans. See
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operating in more than one state, 9 but since the McFadden Act of 1927,10 the
federal government has yielded to the states on the question of geographic
expansion of banking facilities. State regulatory schemes on bank expansion
fall into three categories: those permitting statewide branching with few or no
restrictions on de novo entry, those permitting limited branching, and those
prohibiting branching (thereby allowing only unit banking).' 2 Most of these
banking laws were passed during the period of the depression when safety
rather than efficiency or competition was the goal.' 3 During the 1920s and
1930s approximately 15,000 banks failed' 4 and the various legislative formu-
lations were designed to prevent "overbanking" which many felt had been the
cause of previous failures.'-
These banking laws, however, contained relatively few restrictions on the
merger of banking institutions, and during the 1950s banks began to merge at
an unprecedented rate. Between 1950 and 1959, there were approximately
1500 mergers.' 6 Even more significant was the degree of concentration that
became prevalent, especially in the major cities. At the end of the decade,
"the four largest banks in each of the sixteen most important financial centers
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1963). These characteristics
distinguish commercial banks from other financial institutions such as savings and loan associa-
tions. See Alcorn, Phillipsburg and Beyond-Developing Trends in Substantive Standards for
Bank Mergers, 9 Houston L. Rev. 417, 418 (1972).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), 1842(d) (1970). However, there are a few "grandfather" exceptions. See
id. § 36(a).
10. Id. § 36. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257-58
(1966).
11. An example of limited branching is presented by Oregon Rev. Stat. § 714.050 (1974),
which prohibits branching except through merger in any community with a population less than
fifty thousand where there is an existing bank regularly transacting business. For a discussion of
the various devices that are used to limit branching, see Baker, Bank Expansion: Geographic
Barriers, 91 Banking L.J. 707 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Baker, Geographic Barriers].
12. "At the end of 1970, nineteen states permitted statewide branch banking, sixteen
permitted limited branching, and fifteen had unit banking." Gup, A Review of State Laws on
Branch Banking, 88 Banking L.J. 675 (1971).
13. Baker, Geographic Barriers 710. Donald Baker, who is Deputy Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has described the resulting
situation as follows: "The shadow of the Great Depression darkens the landscape, as ancient
swords rattle against each other in the gloom." Id. at 709.
14. Shull & Horvitz, The Bank Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After, 16 Antitrust Bull. 859,
863 (1971).
15. Comment, Bank Branching in Washington: A Need for Reappraisal, 48 Wash. L. Rev.
611, 616 (1973). Branching restrictions are motivated also by the fear of smaller banks that they
cannot compete with large city-oriented banks. Id.
16. Reid, "The Bank Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After": Comment, 18 Antitrust Bull.
449, 450 (1973). The mergers in the 1950s included some of the giants in the field. For example,
Chase National Bank ($5.7 billion in assets) acquired Manhattan Bank ($1.7 billion); Bankers
Trust Co. ($2.3 billion) acquired Public National Bank (over $500 million); National City Bank
(over $6 billion) acquired First National Bank ($715 million); and Crocker National Bank ($1.5
billion) combined with Anglo National Bank (dose to $1 billion). Shull & Horvitz, The Bank
Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After, 16 Antitrust Bull. 859, 870 (1971).
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of the country controlled sixty percent of all bank assets in those centers.'1 7
Perhaps more surprising was that many of these mergers required no federal
approval despite their profound effect on the national economy.18 Some
antitrust experts considered banking exempt from the antitrust laws because
of its regulated status, 9 and even the Justice Department concurred in this
belief. 20 However, a general feeling arose that some type of action was
necessary to forestall the ever-increasing concentration in the banking indus-
try.
B. The Bank Merger Act of 1960
Congressional reaction to this growing concentration, 2 1 coupled with the
fear that its continuance would lead to a severe restriction of competition in
the banking industry, led to the passage of the Bank Merger Act of 1960.22
The Act established a procedure whereby federal regulatory authorities would
review any proposed merger by banks under their supervision. Review would
be conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency if the acquiring bank was
nationally chartered, by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRS) if the acquiring bank was a member of the system but state
chartered, and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) if the
acquiring bank was a non-member of the FRS but was insured by FDIC. 23
The Act also outlined a number of banking factors to guide the regulatory
agencies and emphasized that their evaluation should include "the effect of
the transaction on competition.12 4 However, despite this reference to the
effect of the merger on competition, many Congressmen felt that banks were
still immune from the antitrust laws.2 s
17. Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L Rev.
213, 221 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kintner & Hansen]; see 105 Cong. Rec. 8114 (1959) (remarks
of Senator O'Mahoney).
18. Kintner & Hansen 221; see Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers,
37 Ind. L.J. 287, 298 (1962).
19. See, e.g., C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy. An Economic and Legal Analysis 42
(1959).
20. A representative of the Justice Department stated: " 'After a complete consideration of this
matter, we have concluded that this Department would not have jurisdiction to proceed under
section 7 of the Clayton Act.'" United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 3Z1, 377 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), quoting Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, pt. 3, at 2141 (1955).
21. 105 Cong. Rec. 8114 (1959) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
22. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970). For a
discussion of the Act and events leading to its passage, see Kintner & Hansen 221-25; Lifland,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob. 15, 17-20 (1967);
Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of Supreme Court Decisions on Bank
Mergers, 59 Va. L. Rev. 860, 862-63 (1973).
23. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970).
24. Id. The banking factors to be used in the evaluation included the financial history and
condition of the banks, adequacy of capital structure, future earnings prospects, character of
management, and the convenience and needs of the community. Id.
25. See, for example, the views of the then Senator Lyndon Johnson who, when referring to
the Act, stated. "It provides for a thorough review. . . of the bank mergers. . . which are now
1975]
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C. Philadelphia and Its Aftermath
By the early 1960s, however, the Justice Department no longer agreed that
banks were immune from antitrust attack. When two of the three largest
banks in the Philadelphia area attempted to merge, the Justice Department
brought its first antitrust suit against banking institutions. In United States v.
Philadelphid National Bank, 26 the Justice Department alleged that the pro-
posed merger violated not only section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 7 but also section
1 of the Sherman Act. 28 To the surprise of many in the banking field, the
Supreme Court sustained the government's section 7 claim.
In addressing the section 7 violation, the Court set about defining "the line
of commerce" and the "section of the country" in order to determine whether
the effect of the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition" therein.
2 9
The question presented in the line of commerce analysis was whether the
services provided by commercial banks constituted a distinct product market,
or whether the market also included similar services provided by other
financial institutions. The Court chose the former, declaring that the commer-
cial bank's "cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as
checking accounts and trust administration) . . . composes a distinct line of
commerce.
'
"30
The question in defining the geographic market was whether to accept a
broad regional market as advocated by the banks31 or the more restricted area
and will continue to be exempt from the antimerger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act." 106 Cong. Rec. 9715 (1960).
26. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Philadelphia National Bank, the second largest bank in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area, with assets over $1 billion sought to acquire the Girard Trust
Corn Exchange Bank with assets over $750 million. The resulting bank would control 36% of all
desposits in the area and the four largest banks would control 77% of deposits. Despite reports
from the Attorney General, the Board of Governors of the FRS, and the FDIC that the merger
would have substantial anticompetitive effects, the Comptroller of the Currency had approved
the merger. Id. at 330-33.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), quoted in part in note 2 supra.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see note 37 infra.
29. 374 U.S. at 355.
30. Id. at 356. The definition of the product market can have a significant effect on the
outcome of an antitrust suit. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
Some commentators feel that the market should be broader than that drawn in Philadelphia and
should include all types of financial institutions, especially if they succeed in broadening their
powers (e.g., savings and loan associations, which are attempting to establish the equivalent of
checking accounts through negotiable orders of withdrawal). See Noble, Antitrust Considerations
Affecting Bank Growth: Greeley and Beyond, 90 Banking L.J. 381, 389 (1973); Smith, Measures
of Banking Structure and Competition, 51 Fed. Res. Bull. 1212, 1218-19 (1965). Others have
suggested an approach including analysis of the submarkets for each type of service provided by
commercial banks and evaluation of the competition furnished by non-bank institutions in each
of these areas. Via, Antitrust and the Amended Bank Merger and Holding Company Acts: The
Search for Standards, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1115, 1120 (1967).
31. The banks argued that the geographic market should be large enough so as to encompass
large banks in New York and elsewhere which presently solicited large scale borrowers and
depositors in the Philadelphia market. 374 U.S. at 360 n.37.
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suggested by the government.3 2 The Court held that the test in defining the
geographic market was to include only that area where "the effect of the
merger on competition will be direct and immediate. '33 After concluding that
banking is essentially local in nature, the Court determined that the appro-
priate geographic market was the Philadelphia metropolitan area where the
merging banks were in direct competition.
34
After defining the relevant markets, the Court proceeded to the ultimate
question of whether the merger violated section 7. In doing so, it utilized an
analysis which Justice Harlan was to later call the "numbers game."--' The
Court looked at two basic factors: the percentage of the market which the
new bank would possess and the over-all concentration of the market. After
determining that the market share would increase to well over 30 percent and
the concentration ratio by over a third the Court concluded "that these
percentages raise an inference that the effect of the contemplated merger...
may be substantially to lessen competition" and that this inference had not
been rebutted. 36 In addition, the Court specifically rejected the proposition
that banks were immune from the antitrust laws either because of the high
degree of governmental regulation or because of the Bank Merger Act of
1960.37
The Philadelphia decision was criticized on a variety of grounds. 3' The
most significant was the Court's reliance on market share and concentration
percentages in lieu of the thorough market analysis previously prescribed by
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.39 In that case, the Court had held that
each merger must be "functionally viewed, in the context of its particular
industry," taking into consideration a wide range of economic variables.
40
The reliance on market share and concentration percentages significantly
32. Id. at 361. "Theoretically, the market area would include the location of all economic
units reacting to the same set of competitive forces on either the supply or the demand side."
Schweitzer, The Definition of Banking Markets, 90 Banking L.J. 745, 749 (1973). On geographic
market delineation in general, see Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 Antitrust Bull. 45 (1973).
33. 374 U.S. at 357.
34. Id. at 361.
35. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 193 (1968) (Harlan J., concurring
& dissenting).
36. 374 U.S. at 365; see id. at 364-66.
37. Id. at 350-51, 368. The Court did not address the Sherman Act violation in Philadelphia,
but it did so in the next year in United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U S. 665
(1964). The Court held that a similar merger would result in an elimination of competition to such
a degree that it constituted "an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § I of the Sherman
Act." Id. at 669-70. Justice Harlan described this case as "a Clayton Act case masquerading in
the garb of the Sherman Act." Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's observation
appears to have been borne out by subsequent litigation on bank mergers-all of which has been
on Clayton Act grounds.
38. See, e.g., Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 173-78
(1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 79, 159-63 (1963).
39. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
40. Id. at 321-22.
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eased the burden of proving the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger.
Philadelphia was similarly criticized for disregarding the complex regulatory
scheme to which banks are subject4 ' and for ignoring the banking factors
which had been included in the Merger Act of 1960 as a means of balancing
the effects of a reduction of competition. 42 More significantly, the decision
prompted a legislative attempt to override the gist of the decision.
D. The Bank Merger Act of 1966
Congressional consideration of the impact of Philadelphia began in the
Senate where Senator Robertson proposed a bill exempting the banking
industry from the antitrust laws43 and giving the regulatory agencies exclusive
and plenary authority over mergers. 44 He also wanted other financial institu-
tions to be considered in determining the product market whenever there was
a question of the competitive effects of a merger. 45 These proposals were
supported by the American Bankers Association and by at least twenty-nine
state banking associations. 46
Opposition quickly developed, however.47 Eventually, after extensive hear-
ings, a compromise bill was passed that was far different from Senator
Robertson's original proposals. 4 8 The bill created what is known as the
"convenience and needs" defense, which permits approval of an anticompeti-
41. One commentator recently stated that the Court in Philadelphia "ventured off on a frolic
of its own, disregarding the thrust of the arguments in the case and making a great effort to avoid
recognizing the fact of the industry's regulation." Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust
Developments-The Year of the Regulated Industry, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 25 (1974).
42. Whitesell & Kamens, Bank Expansion: The Politics of Supreme Court Decisions, 91
Banking L.J. 748, 754-55 (1974). On the banking factors, see note 24 supra.
43. Certain statutes do provide express immunity or exemption from the antitrust laws for
regulated industries. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1970) (telephone companies); 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 222(cX1) (Supp., Feb. 1975) (telegraph carriers); 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II,
1972) (common carriers by water). Such statutes are under review. Address by Joe Sims, Special
Ass't to the Ass't Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., Exec. Seminar, Feb. 28, 1975.
44. Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob.
15, 28 (1967), discussing S. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
45. On this question, Senator Robertson stated: "Such financial institutions [as savings and
loan associations, credit unions, insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and small loan
companies] compete with commercial banks and the effect of this competition must be considered
by the agencies and by the courts when a proposed merger of commercial banks is being
questioned." 112 Cong. Rec. 2664 (1966).
46. Lifland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Bank Mergers, 32 Law & Contemp. Prob.
15, 29 (1967).
47. For example, Representative Wright Patman, who has recently been described as "a
classic, visceral, prairie populist," (N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1975, at 24, col. 6) and who was then
Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, commented on the immunity
proposal in the following manner: " 'If you exempt banks from antitrust, you might as well also
shoot the policeman at the comer.' "Kintner & Hansen 234, quoting N.Y. Herald Trib., May 19,
1965, at 32, col. 1.
48. For a fuller discussion of the Act, see Carter, Bank Mergers: The New Law and Renewed
Litigation, 12 Antitrust Bull. 109 (1967); Kintner & Hansen 233-38; Comment, The 1966
Amendment to the Bank Merger Act, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 764 (1966).
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tive merger if "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."'49 Except for this defense, the antitrust laws were still to apply.50
E. The Supreme Court's View of the Bank Merger Act of 1966
The efficacy of the convenience and needs defense provided by the Bank
Merger Act of 1966 was soon restricted by a series of Supreme Court rulings.
The substantive aspects s ' of the defense were treated in United States v.
Third National Bank,52 a section 7 action brought by the Justice Department.
It was claimed that the Nashville Bank & Trust Company, the acquired
bank, was "a stagnant and floundering" entity and that the convenience and
needs of the community would have been met by permitting it to merge with
the viable Third National Bank.5 3 The Court stated at the outset that
Nashville Trust regularly made a profit and was in no way a "failing"
company.5 4 The Court found that most of the bank's problems "were primar-
ily rooted in unsatisfactory and backward management."5 5 Although the
merger might solve these problems, the Court nevertheless held that the
merger violated section 7.
[W]e think it was incumbent upon those seeking to merge in this case to demonstrate
that they made reasonable efforts to solve the management dilemma of Nashville Bank
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970).
50. See 112 Cong. Rec. 2441, 2444-45 (1966) (remarks of Representative Patman and
Representative Reuss). Representative Reuss has recently replaced Representative Patman as
Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1975, at 1, col.
8. Representative Reuss has been described as "a less unyielding enemy of banks" than
Representative Patman. Id. at 24, col. 5.
51. In a previous decision, United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), the
Court had decided the procedural issues dealing with the 1966 AcL The Court held that an action
challenging a bank merger on the ground of its anticompetitive effects is brought under the
antitrust laws and not under the 1966 Act which merely provided a new defense. The Court also
ruled that even if the regulatory agencies found that the convenience and needs of the community
were met by the merger, the courts could review the issue de novo and the burden of proving the
defense was upon the banks. Id. at 363-66; see Kintner & Hansen 238-41; Williams, Bank
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: Recent Developments, 12 Antitrust Bull. 427 (1967).
52. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
53. Id. at 175, 179. The resulting bank would have controlled more than 38% of the deposits
in the Nashville market and the concentration ratio of the three largest banks would have
increased to 97.9%. Id. at 174.
54. Id. at 183; see International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), which established the
failing company doctrine as a defense to a section 7 action. The doctrine applies when no other
purchasers are available and the acquired company "face[s] the grave probability of a business
failure." Id. at 302. See also Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1960). For a recent review of the history of the doctrine and a
description of an economic model designed to help predict business failure, see Blum, The Failing
Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 75 (1974).
55. 390 U.S. at 188.
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short of merger with a major competitor but failed in these attempts, or that any such
efforts would have been unlikely to succeed. 6
Rejecting a broad interpretation of the convenience and needs defense which
would permit relatively minor problems to overcome a section 7 action, the
Court required that "a showing be made that the gain expected from the
merger cannot reasonably be expected through other means."' - 7 In a sub-
sequent case' s involving the merger of two relatively small banks in New
Jersey, the Court similarly rejected a claim that the proposed merger, which
would have resulted in greater efficiency, a better competitive position, and
expanded service facilities, should be permitted in order to advance the
convenience and needs of the community.5 9 Again, the Court required a
showing that such benefits could be effected only through the particular
merger. 60
After the New Jersey bank case, 6' it was said that
as long as the Court continues to examine the antitrust effects of a merger under
antitrust laws prior to the evaluation of convenience and needs under BMA-66, the
former will always overrule the latter whenever any significant reduction of competi-
tion is found. 6
2
In the seven years that had elapsed since Philadelphia, despite the congres-
sional attempt to intervene, the Justice Department had "succeeded in estab-
lishing the proposition that most mergers of banks which are significant
institutions in a single market can be prevented by invocation of the Clayton
Act. "63
56. Id. at 189.
57. Id. at 190. The Court pointed out that Nashville Trust recently had been acquired by a
group that had agreed to the merger. The Court felt that rather than find solutions to the bank's
problems, the group preferred to merge, "a step which produced a profit of $750,000 on it
two-month investment of $3,800,000." Id. at 192. One commentator indicated that the Nashville
decision did not really establish the elements of a convenience and needs defense, but merely
limited the failing company doctrine. Whitesell & Kamens, Bank Expansion: The Politics of
Supreme Court Decisions, 91 Banking L.J. 748, 760 (1974).
58. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); see Darnell,
The Phillipsburg National Bank Case, 16 Antitrust Bull. 33 (1971); Note, U.S. V. Phillipsburg
National Bank: A Consideration of Commercial Banking as the Relevant Line of Commerce In
Small Bank Situations, 46 Ind. L.J. 348 (1971); Note, Antitrust and Bank Mergers, 25 Sw. L.J.
317 (1971).
59. 399 U.S. at 367, 372.
60. Id. at 372.
61. Justice Harlan pointed out that, after the merger, Phillipsburg National Bank would rank
1,323 out of the approximately 3,100 banks in the country and queried: "With tigers still at large
in our competitive jungle, why should the [Justice] Department be taking aim at such small
game?" Id. at 374 (Harlan, J., concurring & dissenting).
62. Whitesell & Kamens, Bank Expansion: The Politics of Supreme Court Decisions, 91
Banking L.J. 748, 761 (1974).
63. Noble, Antitrust Considerations Affecting Bank Growth: Greeley and Beyond, 90 Bank-
ing L.J. 381, 393 (1973). As a result, the regulatory agencies began using the same antitrust
standards in evaluating mergers. Kintner & Hansen 249.
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III. POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND BANKING
The successes of the Justice Department to this point had concerned
horizontal mergers--mergers between companies in direct competition with
each other in the same relevant market.64 The government next sought to
extend section 7 enforcement to geographic market extension mergers by
banking institutions. A geographic market extension merger is defined as "the
acquisition of a firm located in a different geographic market but engaged in
the same line of commerce as the acquiring firm."'6- Utilization of section 7
against such mergers required invocation of the theory of potential competi-
tion. 66
A. Theory of Potential Competition
The anticompetitive effects of a geographic market extension merger are
less clearly evident than are those of a horizontal merger, since the acquisition
by one bank of another in a separate market does not create an immediate
change in the local market share, concentration ratio, or number of banking
alternatives. 67 One active participant has simply been replaced by an out-
sider. Here, the theory of potential competition comes into play, and its
application has been described as "one of the most elusive exercises in
antitrust." 68
The potential competition concept has developed from a series of cases
which can be divided into three basic categories that occasionally overlap. 69
The first of these deals with what can be classified as the "dominant entrant."
In that situation, a merger results in "the substitution of [a] powerful
acquiring firm for [a] smaller, but already dominant, firm" ' in an oligopoly
market- The resources and capabilities of the acquiring organization, when
coupled with the dominant market position of the acquired firm, will produce
64. Reycraft, Bank Merger Compliance with the Antitrust Laws, 12 Antitrust Bull. 445, 448,
455-64 (1967).
65. Hansen, Greeley Bank. Some Speculations, 90 Banking L.J. 578, 579 (1973). Market
extension mergers may be of two types-the geographic market extension (described in the
accompanying text), which is most pertinent to banking, or the product extension whereby a
company, through merger, acquires a new product line. On this last point, see text accompanying
notes 76-79 infra.
66. For the development of the theory of potential competition and its underlying rationale,
see Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants, is
Antitrust Bull. 489 (1970); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme
Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 Sup. CL Rev. 171; Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 163, 180-90 (1974); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1362-86 (1965); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corpora-
tion: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (1974).
67. Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 Banking
L.J. 116 (1972).
68. Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 180 (1974).
69. For an excellent summary of these categories, see Justice Marshall's opinion in United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
70. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
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a situation whereby the resulting firm will be in a position to dominate the
market. 71 This process, also known as "entrenchment, '7 2 results in the
aggravation of the oligopolistic character of the market 73 by raising barriers to
entry 74 and by discouraging aggressive competition by smaller firms in the
market. 75
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. 76 is an example of the use of potential
competition to forestall a product extension merger by a dominant entrant.
Procter & Gamble, a large, highly diversified producer of household products,
attempted to acquire Clorox Chemical Company, a producer of household
bleach, in order to enter the bleach product market. The market was highly
concentrated with the top six firms controlling 80 percent and Clorox, the
only national producer, having almost 49 percent of national sales. 77 The
Court found that approval of the merger would raise barriers to entry since "a
new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it
would have been to face the smaller Clorox."' 78 Approval of the merger would
also result in anticompetitive effects within the market since "smaller firms
would become more cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by
Procter.79
The second type of potential competition is based on what is known as the
"perceived potential entrant" theory.80 This concept was recognized in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 8' wherein the Supreme Court held that
71. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.23 (1974).
72. Id.
73. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 570 (1972). In this case, Ford, tile
nation's second largest automobile manufacturer, attempted to acquire Electric Autolite Co., a
manufacturer of spark plugs and other automotive equipment. The spark plug market was highly
oligopolistic, with the three major producers controlling 95% of the market, and Autollte, the
third largest, controlling 15%. Id. at 565-66.
74. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).
75. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
76. 386 U.S. 568 (1967); see Comment, FTC v. Procter & Gamble-Are All Mergers Illegal?,
5 Houston L. Rev. 100 (1967).
77. 386 U.S. at 570-72.
78. Id. at 579.
79. Id. at 578.
80. The following have been suggested as prerequisites to the application of the doctrine of
potential competition under this theory: "I. The market concerned must be an oligopoly market:
the number of actual sellers must be sufficiently small for them to be able collectively, though not
necessarily collusively, to maintain prices above competitive levels. 2. The merging firm at the
edge of the market must be recognized by those in the market as the most likely entrant or one of
a very few likely entrants, with barriers to entry by new companies or by other established firms
being significantly higher. 3. The barrier to entry by the firm in question must not be so high
that the price it must expect to obtain before it would come in is above the price that would
maximize the profits of the existing sellers." Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1363 (1965).
81. 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture wherein either party may have entered market
independently held illegal).
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"[t]he existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an
oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition . . .,,s8
within the market. The perceived potential entrant, by its presence "on the
fOnge" of the market, exerts a present procompetitive effect on the market. It
does so because the oligopolists already in the market have the power to
increase present prices to a higher than competitive level, but refrain from
doing so because such higher prices will result in a rate of return that will
encourage entry by the perceived potential entrant.8 3 If such a company
enters through merger, this present procompetitive effect on the market is lost
"with no offsetting gain through an increase in the number of companies
seeking a share of the relevant market. '8 4 It is not necessary that the
perceived potential entrant actually intended to enter but merely that it be
perceived as intending to enter. Thus, the focus of inquiry should not be on
the entrant's conduct or intentions, but rather upon the activities of those
currently in the market.8-5
The third theory upon which the potential competition doctrine is based
involves an "actual potential entrant. '8 6 Its basic premise is that but for the
merger the actual potential entrant eventually would have entered the market
de novo through internal expansion, thus producing future procompetitive
effects. An entry by merger, however, "eliminates the possibility that such
[effects] will take place in the future. 87 Factors to be included in an analysis
of whether a company is an actual potential entrant are the competitive
nature of the market, the geographical proximity of the acquired company,
and the ability and desire of that company to enter the market.8 8 Unlike the
perceived potential entrant theory, which emphasizes the present procompeti-
82. Id. at 174.
83. The limit pricing theory is discussed in Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. i465,
1551-52 (1963); Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L Rev. 163, 186 (1974). For
a decision applying the perceived potential entrant theory to a non-oligopolistic market, see
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 75-79 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974), criticized in 86 Harv. L. Rev. 772 (1973). See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v.
Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974), noted in 43 Fordham L
Rev. 484 (1974), wherein the Second Circuit rejected an apparent attempt to use the perceived
potential entrant and the dominant entrant theories of the potential competition doctrine to
forestall an acquisition of the target company.
84. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 559 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
85. Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 186 (1974).
86. See id. at 183-85; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1379-84 (1965).
87. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 561 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In Penn-Olin, the Court also addressed this factor when it held that the "joint
venture may well foreclose any prospect of competition between Olin and Pennsalt .... " 378
U.S. at 173.
88. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1964). See also
United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168-77 (1964); Whitesell, Potential Competition
and Bank Mergers, 88 Banking L.J. 387, 393-94 (1971).
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tive effects in the target market, the actual potential entrant theory focuses on
the entrant's desires and capability and the possible future competitive effects
of its action. Since the aim of the theory is to produce future procompetitive
effects, its ultimate goal can be described as future deconcentration of the
market.89
The Supreme Court has never utilized the actual potential entrant theory as
the exclusive basis for prohibiting a merger. In United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 90 the Court addressed the fact that the acquired organiza-
tion would most likely attempt to enter the target market in the future, thus
producing future procompetitive effects. 9 1 But the El Paso Court also relied
on the present procompetitive effects that were generated by the unsuccessful
attempt made by the competitor to enter the market. 92 In Penn-Olin, the
Court similarly addressed future anticompetitive effects when it noted that
the joint venture "may well foreclose any prospect of competition between
Olin and Pennsalt . . . . "-93 However, the Court also emphasized the present
procompetitive effects that would be generated by the presence of "an
aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation" on the fringe of the
market. 94 Nevertheless, in the field of banking, the government has relied
primarily on the actual potential entrant theory. 95
B. First National Bancorporation
By 1973, the government had filed over twenty actions on the basis of
potential competition. 96 The Justice Department filed suit when three basic
conditions were met:
(1) The acquiring organization [was] one of but a small number of large, capable,
potential entrants legally eligible to enter a local banking market; (2) the acquired bank
[was] a leader in a concentrated local market; and (3) the acquiror [had] some
alternative means of entry-in other words, either the market [was] growing fast
89. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 632-33 (1974); Robinson,
Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 183-84 (1974).
90. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
91. Id. at 661.
92. Id. at 659. Pacific Northwest, the acquired company in El Paso, was an actual competitor
in the target market since it had unsuccessfully bid directly against El Paso in an attempt to
obtain one of El Paso's customers. Id. at 654-55.
93. 378 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 174; see notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text. See also Judge Friendly's
remarks on this point in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 861 & n,16
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
95. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D. Colo.
1971), affd by an equally divided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973); see notes 99-108 infra and
accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., United States v. United Virginia Bankshares Inc., 347 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va,
1972); United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1970); United States
v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F.
Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133
(N.D. Cal. 1967).
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enough to support additional de novo banks at some time in the future, or a small
competitor [was] present in the market as an entry vehicle. 97
Despite numerous suits in various district courts, the government repeatedly
lost. However, the Justice Department refused to appeal any of the decisions,
preferring to wait for what they considered a strong potential competition
case.
98
The government apparently felt that it had found such a case in United
States v. First National Bancorporation.99 First National Bancorporation, a
statewide holding company, had sought to acquire the First National Bank of
Greeley, the largest bank in Greeley, Colorado. The government claimed a
violation of section 7 because the acquisition would eliminate potential
competition.10 0 Bancorporation was the second largest holding company in
Colorado with 12.9 percent of statewide deposits, but the company had no
holdings in the Greeley area, which was a highly concentrated market with
First National and two bank holding companies controlling 93.7 percent of
the market.10 1 (First National, the only significant independent bank, pos-
sessed 31.8 percent of the market-) 02 The government's primary argument
was that Bancorporation was an actual potential entrant, and that if the
acquisition were disapproved Bancorporation would enter the market in the
future either de novo or through a toehold acquisition (i.e., acquisition of a
small firm which could be developed into a significant competitor), thereby
promoting future competition. 0 3 The district court refused to accept the
argument, relying on statements by Bancorporation that it would not enter
Greeley except for the acquisition, and letters from state and federal regula-
tory authorities stating that no charters would be issued for de novo entry.'04
The court similarly rejected the proposition that Bancorporation was a
97. Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greeley, What?, 90 Banking L.J. 362,
367 (1973).
98. Id. at 370.
99. 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), affd by an equally divided Court, 41U U.S. 577
(1973). This case is discussed in Darnell, Bank Holding Companies and Competition; The First
National Bancorporation Case, 89 Banking L.J. 291 (1972); Noble, Antitrust Considerations
Affecting Bank Growth: Greeley and Beyond, 90 Banking L.J. 381 (1973).
100. 329 F. Supp. at 1010. The Justice Department also claimed that the acquisition would
lessen competition in correspondent banking in Colorado, but the district court did not decide this
issue. Id. at 1016-18. On this point, see Austin & Solomon, A New Antitrust Problem: Vertical
Integration in Correspondent Banking, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 366 (1973).
101. 329 F. Supp. at 1008-09. The court ruled that the relevant geographic market should
include surrounding satellite communities. Id. at 1014.
102. Id. at 1008.
103. Id. at 1014.
104. Id. at 1015. Although discounting its significance, the court appeared to give some
weight to the fact that First National, in recent years, had encountered problems in maintaining
its competitive position in the Greeley market and intimated that the acquisition by Bancorpora-
tion might well improve its competitiveness. Id. at 1014. This thinking runs counter to the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Nashville. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
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perceived potential entrant exerting present procompetitive effects on the
market holding that: "[]ts presence in the wings . . . is not apparent. " 0 5
Despite a statement by Judge Doyle to the effect that this was one of the
weakest potential competition cases prosecuted by the Government, 10 6 the
Justice Department decided to appeal to the Supreme Court.'0 7 The govern-
ment and the banking community eagerly awaited an opinion that would
clarify the issue, but instead were presented with a memorandum decision
whereby an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court.10 8 On the same day, however, the Court decided another
potential competition case that was not just another potential competition
case.
C. Falstaff-Four Views of Potential Competition
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.10 9 involved a section 7 action
based on potential competition. Falstaff, the fourth largest brewer in the
United States, had attempted to extend its operations into New England by
the acquisition of the Narragansett Brewing Company, the largest producer
of beer in that area."10 New England was considered a concentrated market
with the four largest producers controlling 61.3 percent of the market.I' The
government asserted that the acquisition would result in a lessening of
competition "because Falstaff was a potential entrant and because the acquis-
ition eliminated competition that would have existed had Falstaff entered the
market de novo or by acquisition and expansion of a smaller firm, a so-called
'toe-hold' acquisition. "1 2 The district court, relying on statements by Falstaff
that it would not enter the market except through the acquisition, eliminated
Falstaff as an actual potential entrant and concluded that the acquisition
would have no adverse effect on competition."13
105. 329 F. Supp. at 1015.
106. Id. at 1015-16.
107. Pursuant to the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970), as amended Pub. L. No. 93-528,
§ 5 (Dec. 21, 1974) (reproduced at 43 U.S.L.W. 147 (Jan. 21, 1975)), the government brought a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
108. 410 U.S. 577 (1973) (4-4 decision) (Powell, J., not participating).
109. 410 U.S. 526 (1973). For a general discussion of Falstaff, see Robinson, Antitrust
Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 180-90 (1974); Note, United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (1974).
110. 410 U.S. at 527-28. Even though Falstaff was the fourth largest brewer in the United
States, it was considered a regional brewer since it did not sell in all national markets, Its
acquisition of Narragansett, which had 20% of the New England market, was looked upon as
part of an attempt to become a national brewer. Id. at 528-29.
I1l. Id. at 527-28.
112. Id. at 529-30. The government's use of the toehold alternative to de novo entry was
apparently an attempt to get around the problem of proving that an actual potential entrant will
eventually enter the market in the future. By providing such an alternative means of entry that
will not produce the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger, the proof that the acquiring
firm is an actual potential entrant can theoretically be based on a more objective standard than
that provided by the professed intentions of company officials.
113. See id. at 532.
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The seven Justices of the Supreme Court who participated in the decision
issued four opinions. 114 Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun joined, held that the district court had erred as a matter of
law in dismissing the potential competition issue simply because Falstaff was
not an actual potential competitor-that is, a company which would have
entered the market de novo but for the acquisition. They felt the court below
should have given separate consideration to whether Falstaff was a perceived
potential entrant-that is a potential competitor "on the edge" of the market
who exerts a present "beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that
market.""15 Falstaff was therefore remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether Falstaff was a perceived potential entrant."1
6
However, part II of Justice White's opinion contained what is probably the
most significant language on the possible effectiveness of potential competi-
tion as a vehicle to inhibit geographic market extension mergers by banking
institutions. Justice White stated:
We leave for another day the question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will
leave competition in the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and
that is challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but did not,
enter de novo or through 'toe-hold' acquisition and that there is less competition than
there would have been had entry been in such a manner)'17
Justice White stated that although there were "traces of this view" in previous
decisions, the Court had never "squarely faced the question."" 8
Thus, Justice White's opinion accepted the perceived potential entrant
theory of potential competition and remanded on that basis, but the reserva-
tion in part II cast doubt on the independent viability of the actual potential
entrant basis of the doctrine.
Justice Douglas, who concurred in part I of the opinion, disagreed with the
114. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Douglas fied an opinion concurring in part while Justice
Marshall filed an opinion concurring in the result. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Stewart joined. Justices Brennan and Powell took no part in the decision. One
commentator pointed out that "the beer company must have been amazed to find that it was
potentially so many different things to so many different judges." Robinson, Antitrust Develop-
ments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 180 (1974).
115. 410 U.S. at 532-33. For a general discussion of actual and recognized (perceived)
potential entrants, see Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 183-86
(1974). See also the comments of Justice Marshall. 410 U.S. at 559-62.
116. 410 U.S. at 533-34, 537. On remand, the district court found that there was no evidence
that the New England market, prior to the acquisition, was anything but vigorously competitive
or that Falstaff exerted any beneficial influence on other sellers from the wings. United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D.R.I. 1974). The court also determined that
rational brewers in the market, relying on objective economic criteria, would not have concluded
that Falstaff would have entered the market. Id. at 1024. The court reinforced its findings by
using post-acquisition evidence which indicated that competition had actually increased in the
market after Falstaff entered. Id. at 1027.
117. 410 U.S. at 537.
118. Id.
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appropriateness of this reservation since "it was [not] a prerequisite to the
Government's case to prove that the acquisition had marked immediate, i.e.,
present, anticompetitive effects."" 9 Justice Marshall agreed, stating that the
elimination of future competition was sufficient to violate section 7. He
concurred in the remand, however, not on the perceived potential entrant
basis-which was not argued by the government12 0 -but on the grounds that
Falstaff was an actual potential entrant.1 2 ' Justices Rehnquist and Stewart
agreed on this last point but voted to dismiss on the basis of the district
court's determination of the issue. 122
In Falstaff, the Supreme Court for the first time clearly distinguished the
actual and perceived potential entrant bases of potential competition. It
accepted the perceived potential entrant theory and defined its various
elements.1 23 However, there was a serious division of opinion on the actual
potential entrant theory. Three Justices, while reserving the question, indi-
cated that there were serious doubts as to its viability. The four remaining
Justices accepted the theory, but differed on the acceptable level and burden
of proof. These differences raised serious questions in the banking industry,
119. Id. at 538-39 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas indicated that section 7 does not
require " 'merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon competition, but a
prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future . . . .' " Id. at 539 (quoting
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963)). The requirements of section
7 " 'are satisfied when a "tendency" toward monopoly or the "reasonable likelihood" of a
substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown.' " 410 U.S. at 539 (quoting
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964)). Justice Douglas was
inclined to reverse and direct judgment for the government on the basis that Falstaff was an
actual potential entrant, but since the Court reserved judgment on this question, he concurred in
the remand. 410 U.S. at 544-45.
120. The government's complaint alleged only that the merger violated section 7 because It
eliminated potential competition. Justice White, however, stated that "since potential competition
may stimulate a present procompetitive influence, the allegation certainly encompassed the
'on-the-fringe influence' that the District Court failed to consider, and the Government was not
required to be more specific in its allegation." 410 U.S. at 534 n.13.
121. Id. at 563-72 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall felt that the trial court had
used an erroneous standard in determining that Falstaff was not an actual potential entrant.
Rather than using the "subjective" testimony of Falstaff's management to determine whether
Falstaff was an actual potential entrant, the trial court should have relied on "objective"
economic facts. Id. See also United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1242-47
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974), in which the district court emphasized the
need to rely on objective factors in determining whether a company is a perceived potential
entrant.
122. 410 U.S. at 575-76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice
Stewart joined, rejected Justice Marshall's distinction between subjective and objective evidence
as "largely illusory." Id. at 575.
123. According to Justice White, the following factors should have been considered in
determining Falstaff's on-the-fringe effect: Falstaff was in the relevant line of commerce, was
admittedly interested in entering the concentrated Northeastern market, this interest was known
by those already in the market, and Falstaff had the capability to enter. 410 U.S. at 534-35 n. 13.
For an analysis challenging some of the presumptions of such factors, see Note, United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837 (1974).
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since the actual potential entrant theory was generally the primary basis upon
which the Justice Department hoped to halt geographic market extension
mergers by banks. 1
24
D. Marine Bancorporation-An Unequivocal "No"
The answers came in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 12- wherein
the Justice Department challenged the proposed merger of two commercial
banks in the State of Washington. The acquiring organization, the National
Bank of Commerce, was the second largest bank in the state with almost 20
percent of the statewide market.12 6 It had 107 branches in Seattle and lesser
developed areas of Washington. However, it had no offices in Spokane,
where it hoped to acquire the Washington Trust Bank which controlled
approximately 19 percent of the local market. 27 The Spokane market was
concentrated, with the three largest banking organizations controlling 92
percent of the market. 128
The relevant product market was commercial banking, and the geographic
market was metropolitan Spokane since that was the only market where the
acquired bank was an active participant. 12 9 There was no dispute on these
points. However, the government argued that the statewide banking structure
should also have been considered in determining the anticompetitive effects of
the proposed merger. Relying on a recently developed Justice Department
theory of linkage of oligopolies,' 30 the government contended that the entire
state was also an appropriate "section of the country" for section 7 purposes
even though it was not the relevant geographic banking market. The gov-
ernment asserted that state law and state boundaries insulated Washington
banks from out of state competition' 3' and that mergers of the type at issue
would
lead eventually to the domination of all banking in the State by a few large banks,
facing each other in a network of local, oligopolistic banking markets. This . . . , it
[was] argued, will enhance statewide the possibility of parallel, standardized, anticom-
petitive behavior. 132
The Court recognized that it had previously "acknowledged the existence of
124. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (D.
Colo. 1971), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973). See also notes 99-108 supra
and accompanying text.
125. 418 U.S. 602 (1974); see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 251-58
(1974).
126. 418 U.S. at 643 (App.).
127. Id. at 606-07.
128. Id. at 609. The state banking structure was also concentrated, with the two largest
organizations controlling 51% of the market and the five largest, 74%. Id. at 643 (App.).
129. Id. at 618-19.
130. See Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greeley, What?, 90 Banking L.J.
362 (1973); Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89
Banking L.J. 116 (1972).
131. 418 U.S. at 620; see text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
132. 418 U.S. at 620.
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more than one relevant geographic market," but it had never measured the
effects of a merger "on areas where the acquired firm is not a direct
competitor.' 33 It rejected the government's contention, holding that "the
relevant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in
which the acquired firm is an actual, direct competitor."M 34 To accept the
government's theory of a linkage of oligopolies without evidence of resulting
anticompetitive effects would be "to espouse a per se rule against geographic
market extension mergers."' 35
The remainder of the government's case was based on potential competi-
tion. The Justice Department first treated the National Bank of Commerce as
an actual potential entrant which, by entering de novo or through a toehold
acquisition, "would assist in deconcentrating that market over the long
run."13 6 Additionally, the government claimed that Commerce was a per-
ceived potential entrant whose presence on the fringe of the market generated
present procompetitive effects. 137 Finally, the government introduced a novel
theory which could be considered an additional basis for potential competi-
tion. It contended that the merger would eliminate the possibility that the
acquired bank would eventually expand "into a regional or ultimately
statewide counterweight to the market power of the State's largest banks.' 38
The Court initially addressed the question of the applicability of potential
competition to the banking industry by holding that commercial banks must
pass muster under the doctrine.1 39 However, the Court further held "that the
application of the doctrine to commercial banking must take into account the
unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into that line of
commerce."' 40 "Such limitations often significantly reduce, if they do not
eliminate, the likelihood that the acquiring bank is either a perceived poten-
tial de novo entrant or a source of future competitive benefits through de novo
or foothold entry."' 4 1
The Court then addressed the question reserved in Falstaff-whether
section 7 prohibits a merger based on the actual potential entrant theory when
33. Id. at 621.
134. Id. at 622. In a companion case, United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 6S6
(1974), the district court had defined the entire state as the relevant geographic market. The
Supreme Court overruled that holding, pointing out that if the state was the relevant market, the
merger should be analyzed in terms of direct competition and not potential competition.
However, since the banks concerned were not statewide banks and did not do business or
compete on that basis, they could not be considered direct competitors in a statewide market. Id.
at 666-67.
135. 418 U.S. at 623. The Court did exclude those cases such as FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), "where an acquiring firm's market power, existing capabilities, and
proposed merger partner are such that the merger would produce an enterprise likely to dominate
the target market (a concept known as entrenchment)." 418 U.S. at 623 n.23.
136. 418 U.S. at 615.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 627.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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the merger has no present anticompetitive effect in the market, but may
forestall future procompetitive effects which would be generated by de novo
or toehold entry. 14 2 However, before resolving the question, the Court
required that "[t]wo essential preconditions" be met- that there exist "avail-
able feasible means" for entering the market and that "those means offer a
substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market
or other significant procompetitive effects.'1 43
Imposition of these two preconditions was fatal to the government's case.
Washington permitted only limited branching and forbade branching by a
bank into any city or town where another bank was located, other than in the
branching bank's own principal place of business.44 Since numerous banks
were located in Spokane, the National Bank of Commerce could not enter de
novo. The government presented two alternatives. The first was that Com-
merce sponsor a new bank in Spokane, insure that the stock was in "friendly
hands," and eventually acquire the bank. 145 Without ruling on the legality of
this plan, the Court rejected it on the grounds that Commerce would be
prohibited from branching from this sponsored bank after it was acquired.14 6
Without the ability to branch, there was "no reasonable likelihood of develop-
ing a significant share" of the market and thereby deconcentrating it. 1 7 The
government's second alternative, the acquisition of either of two smaller
banks in Spokane, was similarly rejected since Commerce would not be
permitted to branch from either of these.148 Since the government failed to
meet the preconditions to a resolution of the Falstaff reservation, the Court
did not reach the question. 149
After rejecting the government's initial contention, the Court quickly
disposed of the final two arguments. As to the perceived potential entrant
argument, the Court assumed that "[r]ational commercial bankers in
Spokane" were aware of the regulatory barriers that rendered Commerce "an
unlikely or an insignificant potential entrant," and since that was the case,
Commerce could not have exerted "any meaningful procompetitive influence"
while it was on the fringe of the market. 150 The Court curtly dismissed the
final contention that the merger would preclude the acquired bank from
142. Id. at 632; see notes 117-24 supra and accompanying text.
143. 418 U.S. at 633.
144. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1974).
145. 418 U.S. at 633-34. Washington prohibits the acquisition of a newly-chartered bank for
a period of ten years except with the approval of the state supervisor of banking. Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 30.08.020(7) (Supp. 1974).
146. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1974).
147. 418 U.S. at 636. The Court once again emphasized the controlling aspect of the state
and federal regulatory restraints by stating- "In sum, it blinks reality to conclude that the
opportunity for entry through sponsorship, assuming its availability, is comparable to the entry
alternatives open to unregulated industries such as those involved in this Court's prior potential-
competition cases or would be likely to produce the competitive effects of a truly unfettered
method of entry." Id. at 637 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. t 637-38.
149. Id. at 639.
150. Id. at 639-40.
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becoming a statewide banking power by pointing out that there was no
evidence that Washington Trust Bank (the acquired bank) had ever enter-
tained ideas of expanding beyond Spokane.'15
The Court concluded that potential competition would seldom bar a merger
in states containing such stringent regulatory barriers as existed in
Washington. It. went further by pointing out that even in states which permit
liberal branching or multibank holding companies, "great weight" should be
given to the testimony of regulatory officials on the feasibility of the issuance
of new charters. 1-2
Justice White, dissenting, decried what he called "the Court's new anti-
trust majority" for redefining the elements of potential competition and
escalating the burden of proving a section 7 violation. 15 3 He felt that both
methods of entry suggested by the government would have been sufficient to
establish a "prima facie" case that Commerce was an actual potential com-
petitor. 15 4 Justice White referred to several small banks in Washington that
had succeeded in gaining significant competitive positions in their local
markets and pointed out that Commerce, a major financial institution with a
full range of services, could be equally successful in Spokane.155 After the
majority ruling, it would no longer be sufficient to show that a potential
entrant had the capability and willingness to enter a market and could do so
as a profitable concern, but it would also be necessary to show "that the new
entrant will appropriate for itself a substantial part of the business of the
major competitors in the market."'1 56 Justice White concluded that since the
case turned on barriers to "effective competition" rather than on barriers to
entry, it would not be "easily limited to regulated industries."' 5 7
IV. POSTSCRIPT TO Marine Bancorporation
The doctrine of potential competition is somewhat amorphous and the
burden of proving its various elements often a difficult task. Falstaff and
Marine Bancorporation, while clarifying some of the elements of the potential
competition theory, have raised certain questions concerning the various
concepts upon which it is based.' 58
A. The Reservation in Falstaff
The Court's reservation in Falstaff of the question whether an actual
potential entrant must also have present procompetitive effects in the target
151. Id. at 640-41. Washington Trust had seven branches within Spokane. Id. at 607.
152. Id. at 641.
153. Id. at 642 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the dissent.
Justice Douglas took no part in the decision, but he did join the dissenters in the similar case,
United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 673 (1974). Justice White also referred to
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), wherein the new majority
"sustained the failing-company defense in a new guise." 418 U.S. at 642 (White, J., dissentitg).
154. 418 U.S. at 646.
155. Id. at 649 & n.3.
156. Id. at 654.
157. Id. at 654 n.5.
158. The following discussion will be limited in scope and will deal only with the effect of the
decisions on the banking industry.
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market, was left unanswered in Marine Bancorporation. 1s9 The Justice
Department evidently felt that the actual potential entrant theory was
sufficient to establish a section 7 violation since it was the government's
primary argument in both cases. 160 Justices Douglas and M1Iarshall believed
that the concept had been previously accepted by the Court,/ 6 1 but the
majority opinions in both cases leave the question open. Whether the new
antitrust majority, which Justice White criticized in his dissent, 62 will go so
far as to reject the actual potential entrant theory remains to be seen, but the
imposition of the two preconditions to a resolution of the question has
certainly increased the government's task in attempting to utilize potential
competition as a vehicle to forestall geographic market extension mergers by
banking institutions.
B. The Preconditions and the Emphasis on Regulatory
Restraints
Prior to Marine Bancorporation, it was generally assumed that it was
sufficient for the government to prove that an alternative feasible means of
entry was available. 163 In addition to severely restricting what could be
considered a feasible means of entry, the Marine Bancorporation Court
imposed the additional requirement that, at least in the banking context,
these alternative means be sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the
market would become deconcentrated. 164 The emphasis given by the Court to
regulatory restraints means that it is now almost impossible to prove that
alternative means of entry are available in the 60 percent of our states which
either prohibit or limit branching by devices similar to those used in
Washington. 165 These statutory restrictions will generally prohibit de novo
branching into any significant market. The second precondition-requiring a
reasonable possibility of deconcentration-wvill foreclose requiring use of a
toehold acquisition as an alternative means of entry unless branching is
permitted from the toehold. In those states that permit statewide branching,
the Court indicated that "great weight" should be given to the statements of
regulatory officials on the feasibility of de novo entry. Thus, a mere statement
by a local regulatory official that de novo entry will not be permitted may be
determinative of the issue. 166 This priority given to bank regulators in a
potential competition case is far different from that shown in the horizontal
bank merger cases; there, the regulatory status of the industry has been given
little or no weight. 167 It is unclear whether this reflects the Court's dislike of
159. 418 U.S. at 639.
160. Id. at 626; United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973).
161. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
162. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
163. See 418 U.S. at 646 (White, J., dissenting).
164. See notes 143-49 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 87-89 infra and accompanying texL
167. See, e.g., United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1967) (the
competitive effects of a merger are determined on the basis of the antitrust laws and not bank
regulatory statutes); United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 368 (1963) (banks
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the potential competition doctrine generally or the feeling that it is inappro-
priate in a highly regulated industry where barriers to entry are traditionally
high.
C. Rejection of Linkage Theory
The Court's rejection of the government's theory of a statewide linkage of
oligopolies 168 might well be the coup de grace to the Justice Department's
attempts to halt statewide concentration of banking. The Court basically
refused to look upon the state as a market.1 69 The Court apparently would
recognize a statewide market only when there is direct competition on a
statewide basis-both banks competing for customers and providing services
on a statewide basis. In United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 170
Connecticut law permitted branching except into towns where other banks
were headquartered.'71 This resulted in a "checkerboard" pattern of open and
dosed towns throughout the state. In Connecticut, the Court instructed the
district court to determine the relevant market by considering only those areas
where either of the merger partners had offices, excluding any "gaps" where
neither were represented.' 72 Thus, to have a statewide market, a bank must
evidently be represented in almost every significant market in the state.
A persuasive argument can be made for the Court's rejection of the linkage
of oligopoly theory which was argued by the government in Marine Bancor-
poration. In effect, the government was asking the Court to accept a
geographic market on the basis of what might occur in the future-namely, a
statewide system of individual oligopolies whereby a few large banks control
the major share of all significant local markets. This argument could have
validity when significant movement in that direction has already taken place,
but in Washington, that was obviously not the case.
The inapplicability of the linkage of oligopoly argument and the stringent
state statutory barriers to entry placed the government in an untenable
position. To support its argument that alternative means of entry were
available, the government could rely only on de novo entry or a toehold
acquisition, but both were highly doubtful methods under the circumstances.
The imposition of the two preconditions and the statutory prohibition of
branching were, therefore, determinative of the outcome since they enabled
the Court to eliminate both alternative methods of entry.
were not immune from the antitrust laws because of the high degree of regulation to which they
were subject).
168. See notes 130-35 supra and accompanying text.
169. One commentator felt that the Court's rejection of the multimarket theory was correct
because such "invocation of section seven based on the bare possibility of collusion would result
in the prohibition of many innocent mergers." The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
13, 256 (1974).
170. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
171. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-59 (Supp. 1975).
172. 418 U.S. at 669.
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D. The Future
Mter almost a decade of conflict with the Justice Department, the banking
industry has attained its first significant victory at the Supreme Court level. 173
The industry looked upon its merger activity as motivated by economic
necessity, 174 which included the need to increase assets so as to attract and
service large industrial clients, to diversify services, and to attain economies
of scale. 175 It viewed the bank regulatory agencies as far more qualified to
judge the impact of mergers than the Justice Department, which was "not
equipped either by temperament or staffing to carry out the role . .. .176
Since it was highly regulated, the industry saw no reason why it should not be
exempt from the antitrust laws, as were other regulated industries. 177
The Justice Department, on the other hand, looked upon competition as "a
basic national economic policy, and the cornerstone of national economic
strength.' 178 The Department felt that its role was to demonstrate a "healthy
skepticism" toward abandoning competition in favor of a regulatory scheme
and it looked upon itself "as an advocate for a national economic policy" and
not of some "particular vested interest" as do some regulatory agencies.17 9
In the field of banking, the Department has proceeded on the basis that
banks, like other industrial organizations, will engage in anticompetitive and
sometimes even predatory practices if a viable competitive market is elimi-
nated.' 80 For this reason, the government took its first steps to halt the
173. The Supreme Court has actually reversed roles. One commentator has described
previous antitrust battles as "distilling the pervasive theme of confrontation between the banking
industry, its regulators and Congress on one side, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, frequently abetted and sometimes even led by the Supreme Court of the United States on
the other." Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-The Year of the Regulated
Industry, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 23 (1974).
174. See Hale & Hale, Concentration as a Factor in Antimerger Litigation, 28 Ohio St. L.J.
599, 609 (1967).
175. See Casson & Burrus, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, 18 Am. U.L. Rev. 677,
679-81 (1969); Kintner & Hansen, supra note 17, at 216-17; \Vu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An
Economic View of Supreme Court Decisions on Bank Mergers, 59 Va. L. Rev. 860, 878-80
(1973).
176. Reycraft, Antitrust Problems in Banking-1971, 16 Antitrust Bull. 817, 817-18 (1971).
See Comment, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 764, 789
(1966).
177. Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of Supreme Court Decisions on
Bank Mergers, 59 Va. L. Rev. 860, 883-84 (1973). The authors referred to the statutory
exemption provided transportation companies. See id. at 883-84 & n.119, citing Seaboard Air
Line R.R v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1965); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 296 (1963); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
178. Baker, The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice: The Role of Competition in
Regulated Industries, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 571, 591 (1970).
179. Id. at 593.
180. Although various aspects of banking are regulated by state and federal authorities, there
are areas where anticompetitive practices may take place. These include required compensatory
deposit balances on loans, loan interest rates, loan availability to different customer classes, rates
paid on time deposits, service charges, and, generally, banking innovation and efficiency. Also
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
increasing wave of bank mergers. 18 1 Section 7 proved to be effective in
halting horizontal mergers, but when the government attempted to utilize
potential competition to halt statewide concentration of banking, it met with
repeated defeats at the district court level and ultimately in the Supreme
Court.
In Marine Bancorporation, the Justice Department found its linkage of
oligopoly argument rejected and the actual potential entrant concept of
potential competition severely restricted. Whether the Court eventually will
accept the latter theory remains to be seen. The result is that the government
will be forced to rely on the perceived potential entrant basis of potential
competition. Falstaff outlined conditions necessary to utilize this theory. 182
Basically, the acquiring organization must have both the desire and capability
to enter an oligopolistic market and this must be known by those already in
the market who, theoretically, modify their behavior on the basis of this
perception. 183 The problem with this theory in a regulated field such as
banking was demonstrated in Marine Bancorporation where the regulatory
scheme created a significant barrier to entry. 84 With such barriers present,
the Court was realistic in its conclusion that bankers in the target market
would hardly modify their behavior when the possibility for market entry was
so tenuous. 18s Except for the relatively few states which have minimal
restrictions on entry and subsequent branching, it appears that the doctrine of
potential competition will have minimal future effects in the field of bank-
ing. 186
Although credible arguments could be made for these facets of the Marine
Bancorporation holding, the Court's emphasis on regulatory controls is far
more questionable. During the 1960s, over sixteen hundred bank mergers
took place and many of these were subject to only cursory review by the
regulatory authorities. 8 7 In the aggregate, the three federal regulatory agen-
cies approved 97.7 percent of these mergers whereas the Justice Department
significant is the degree of flexibility on loans during cyclical economic downswings, since large
banks give priority to large customers while smaller banks have a more local orientation.
Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 Banking L.J.
116, 123, 129 (1972). On predatory practices in general, see Shull, Bank Expansion: The New
Competition and the Old Predatory Practices, 91 Banking L.J. 726 (1974). On the "odor" of
compensatory deposit balances on loans, see Cohen, The Antitrust Laws Applied to Bank
Mergers, Reciprocity and Tie-in Arrangements, 26 Bus. Law. 1, 6 (1970).
181. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 123 supra.
183. For a recent decision using similar factors to determine whether a company was a
perceived potential entrant, see United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
184. See notes 144-49 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
186. The dominant entrant theory might be available even in a regulated field such as
banking where there is a danger of entrenchment. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
418 U.S. 602, 623 n.23 (1974). See also notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
187. Whitesell & Kamens, Bank Expansion: The Politics of Supreme Court Decisions, 91
Banking L.J. 748, 750 (1974).
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found adverse competitive impact in 59.8 percent of the cases. 88 It is clear
that the regulatory agencies do not have the same view of competitive impact
as the Justice Department. Although the Court may be relying on the
regulatory agencies as an objective source of impartial testimony, their record
should cast doubt on that assumption. 18 9
Similarly, statements by industry officials should not be given the weight
the Court appears willing to give them. 190 Here again is the problem
demonstrated in Falstaff, the acceptability of subjective versus objective
evidence. The Greeley case provides a pertinent example of the pitfalls of
overreliance on subjective information. Bancorporation, in addition to at-
tempting to acquire a large bank in Greeley, also attempted to do the same in
Colorado Springs and Pueblo. However, when Justice Department action
prevented the latter two acquisitions, Bancorporation entered both markets
by toehold acquisitions. 19 1 Although objective evidence is often difficult to
develop in complex antitrust actions, basing decisions primarily on subjective
testimony, which "is obviously biased and self-serving,"' 92 cannot be jus-
tified. 193
188. Reid, "The Bank Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After": Comment, 18 Antitrust Bull.
449, 458-59 (1973).
189. In Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971), the court stated. "Parenthetically, and by way of expressing our
agreement with the Supreme Court's policy of strictly limiting all antitrust exemptions in
deference to regulatory bodies, we also note that the history of United States regulatory agencies
in general seems usually to record an ever growing absence of the spirit required for vigorous
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Rather, it seems to demonstrate that shortly following the
establishment of administrative procedures, the regulatory agency usually becomes dominated by
the industry which it was created to regulate." Id. at 273.
The statements of state regulatory officials should also be looked upon with some degree of
skepticism. For example, in First National Bancorporation, testimony of state and federal
regulatory officials indicated that no new charters would be issued to Bancorporation, thus
foreclosing de novo entry as an alternative means of entry. 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1015 (D. Colo.
1971), afld by an equally divided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973). Yet the Colorado State Banking
Commission subsequently granted an application to another holding company permitting it to
enter Greeley de novo. Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greeley, What?, 90
Banking L.J. 362, 373 (1973). One might also question whether federal antitrust policies should
be based on subjective findings by state authorities. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 54 Fed.
Res. Bull. 639, 641 (1968) (dissenting opinion), three Federal Reserve Governors stated that "[tihe
effectiveness of the Bank Merger Act should not be blunted by capitulation to the anticompetitive
policies of State authorities; the State policies may well be changed, particularly if they are not
reinforced by the actions of Federal authorities."
190. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534-36 (1973) (the testimony
of company officials on the feasibility of de novo entry was not "irrelevant" nor "to be looked
upon with suspicion").
191. Baker, Banking Competition in the Age of the Computer, 90 Banking L.J. 193, 202
(1973); Baker, Potential Competition in Banking- After Greeley, What?, 90 Banking L.J. 362,
372-73 (1973).
192. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 565 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
193. Id. at 569-70.
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The Court's new antitrust majority has taken a skeptical view of potential
competition at least as concerns regulated industries. 194 The emphasis on
regulatory schemes, the rejection of multimarkets, and the establishment of
preconditions to a finding that a bank is an actual potential entrant all point
to the doctrine's inability to halt statewide concentration of banking. The
liberalization of state banking statutes by removing restraints on de novo
entry may help to alleviate the problem. 195 However, the other precondition
to invocation of the potential competition doctrine leads to the conclusion that
potential competition as a viable weapon in the field of banking has been
severely undermined. 196
Thomas J. O'Connell
194. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 252 (1974).
195. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:9A-19 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Banking Law § 105 (McKinney
Supp. 1974). One commentator described banking legislation in the following manner: "Legisla-
tive deliberations over these laws tend to be special-interest battles between contending industry
factions. The consumers of financial services-the people with the ultimate interest-seem to
have been overwhelmed by the complexities of the field and have left the matter to the banks and
the politicians." Baker, Geographic Barriers, supra note 11, at 712.
196. See Horsley, Marine Bancorporation, Connecticut National Bank and Potential Compe-
tition: A Critique, 55 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 23 (1975).
